12. Adhering to the enemies of the United States, giving them aid and comfort, as witnessed by consorting with, supporting and installing to powerful Federal positions persons who in writing, word and deed have called for and promoted the overthrow of America’s constitutionally guaranteed Republican form of government, and the overthrow of the United States Constitution; including but not limited to William Ayers, Bernadette Dohrn, Cass Sunstein, John Holdren, Van Jones, Dalia Mogahed, Harold Koh, and Eric Holder, in violation of U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section IV and U.S. Penal Code, Section 2385.
Source: wordpress.com
Video: Trick or Treat (Chapter 9/12)
Former Los Gatos Convent Employee Pleads Guilty to Embezzling from Catholic Nuns
SAN JOSE, CA—A former employee for the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary Catholic Convent (the Convent) in Los Gatos, California, pled guilty in federal court this morning to 14 counts of wire fraud and three counts of mail fraud, United States Attorney Melinda Haag announced. In pleading guilty, Linda Gomez (a/k/a Linda Surrett), 66, formerly of Sunnyvale, California, admitted that she used her administrative positions to embezzle cash and to charge personal expenses to a Convent charge card. According to the indictment, between 1987 and 2010, Gomez worked for the Convent in various administrative capacities, including as the director of food services and the manager of an on-site convenience store. As part of her professional responsibilities, Gomez made purchases for the 75 Catholic nuns and 60 lay employees at the Convent. The indictment charges that between March 2008 and her resignation in May 2010, Gomez used various methods to embezzle from the Convent, including obtaining fraudulent reimbursements or credits for products she falsely claimed she had purchased for the Convent and its nuns. The indictment states that Gomez embezzled more than $100,000 from the Convent. In addition to embezzling more than $47,000 in cash, Gomez also diverted more than $53,000 of Convent funds for personal expenses such as jewelry, high-end cutlery, purses, shoes, kitchen appliances, and numerous purchases on the QVC and Home Shopping Networks. Gomez was charged in an indictment filed in San Jose federal district court on December 22, 2011. There is no plea agreement in the case. Gomez pled guilty to all 17 counts of wire and mail fraud charged in the indictment. The sentencing of Gomez is scheduled for March 28, 2013, at 10 AM before United States District Court Judge D Lowell Jensen in San Jose. The maximum statutory penalty for wire fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343, and mail fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, is 20 years in prison and a fine of $1 million, plus restitution. Assistant United States Attorney Joseph Fazioli is prosecuting the case with the assistance of Legal Assistant Kamille Singh. The prosecution is the result of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Further Information: Case #: CR 11-00955 DLJ A copy of this press release may be found on the United States Attorney’s Office’s website at www.usdoj.gov/usao/can. Reported by: FBI
Source: 7thspace.com
Reid Kyl Online Poker Bill Revealed – All 73 Pages
(12) Internet gambling, like much other Internet commerce, traverses State boundaries. Any particular transaction may cross a number of State boundaries from origin to destination, and communications between the same parties at different times may travel along markedly different routes, based on factors such as traffic, load capacity, and other technical considerations outside the control of sender and recipient. For that reason, among others, the Federal courts consistently have ruled that the Internet is an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce and, as such, is subject to Congress’s plenary authority. For these same reasons, Internet gambling by its very nature implicates Federal concerns, and is different in kind and effect from traditional gambling activity.
Source: gambling911.com
Bankruptcy United States Code (USC Title 11 Complete)
Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. Source: barstowwatch.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: howtofilebankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcylawyersco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com
Source: chapter11la.com
Bankruptcy Options for Underwater Property in Jacksonville, Florida
[...] Four years later, the consequences of the subprime mortgage crisis continue as many homeowners and property investors in Florida struggle to sustain mortgage payments on underwater property. Owners also continue to struggle to sell or re-finance their property, either due to negative equity or tightened credit requirements, or a combination of these factors. Some Florida homeowners have chosen to fight foreclosure proceedings in state court. Except in very rare instances, the foreclosure defense process merely delays the inevitable loss of the property. Other homeowners seek relief through a short sale, which may prove beneficial where the lender offers cash and other incentives to the homeowner in exchange for maintaining and marketing the property. Still, short sales often are time consuming, may result in 1099 tax liability for debt forgiveness, and certainly results in loss of the home. Title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) provides another alternative for individuals and companies in financial distress, through Chapter 7 Liquidation, Chapter 11 Reorganization, or Chapter 13 Debt Adjustment for Individuals with Regular Income.Source: planlaw.com [...]
Source: planlaw.com
Developers are Crabgrass: Ramsey’s second million dollar man. Sort of. Not quite. Not yet. Stay tuned. And, can you say “consent agenda?” And, coincidences mount, the audio
Let’s work this out. In effect, it reduces to a land-for-land swap. That’s what it is. So why have they not negotiated a “boot” amount to go to Wise over and above the land swap? Why go through the strange exercise of divining a “price” for the Wise stuff as is, and another “price” for the Wise new stuff, as it will be? If it is a like-kind transaction to Wise within an allowed time frame, Wise needs not recognize any taxable capital gain and keeps his historic basis in the new place. That means the price for the old place can be “x” and the new place “y” or just as easily juggle things with the old place at “2x” and the new at “y + x” with the “boot” to Jeff being identical either way, X being greater than Y. Could all this pricing stuff be focused on setting a commission amount to Landform? And would Landform’s view of exigency be colored by a chance that a swing in council makeup might trigger the 30-day termination right the city holds in its contract with Landform? As to how the cash would be flowing – county to city pocket, to HRA pocket, to Jeff, to HRA pocked on buying the new site – and the larger the amount so “flowed” the easier it would be for the gamblers who used reserves to buy the distressed thing to say, see we are paying back the reserves we “borrowed” so reelect us, please. The size of the Landform commission and the “on the accounting books” amortization of the borrowed reserves run parallel, as motives for possibly kiting phantom prices in what in essence is a land-for-land plus boot transaction. __________UPDATE_________ Someone emailed: Is it even legal to use money from the road improvement fund or equipment replacement fund for other purposes? These guys have used these and other funds as their own personal piggy bank for general uses and for the Flaherty & Collins project. These funds are now dangerously low. They’ve placed us in jeopardy of losing our currant bond rating. The “piggy bank” is an apt term, but not personal, in the sense nobody’s proven to be funneling things for themselves. I like the term “slush fund” better. One big slush fund, to gamble as the mood fits; in hopes winning not losing bets are being made. I replied to that email: It is gambling with the seed corn. It only starves you if you lose. You have to presume Nedegaard did not go into things anticipating failure. These folks on council now, with a consultant to advise, are not anticipating failure either. Back to the question, whether legal or not, is it showing good judgment to slush out reserves beyond a prudent level of shrinkage – and might it “place us in jeopardy of losing our current bond rating?” Might it also lead to city, HRA, or EDA taking advantage of municipal bankruptcy law? Cities in California have done exactly that. Google Stockton, San Bernadino, or Mammoth Lakes. Along with the word “bankruptcy.” There are as many theories online as reports about those towns. But the thread is mismanagement of the budget and reserves. The chickens coming home to roost. And it can happen not on the offenders’ watch, but to those subsequently stepping into the mire to mop things up. Try this. You will not like it. __________FURTHER UPDATE_________ Rome failed. It could happen to Ramsey. One too many Emperors with the wrong ideas or skill sets; we are tinier than Rome. __________FURTHER UPDATE_________ There is Minn. Stat. Sect. 471.831 “MUNICIPALITY MAY FILE BANKRUPTCY PETITION” stating: Subdivision 1.Any relief under bankruptcy code. A municipality, as defined in subdivision 2, may file a petition and seek any relief available to it under United States Code, title 11, as amended through December 31, 1996. Subd. 2.Municipality defined. In this section, “municipality” means a municipality as defined in United States Code, title 11, section 101, as amended through December 31, 1996, but limited to a county, statutory or home rule charter city, or town; or a housing and redevelopment authority, economic development authority, or rural development financing authority established under chapter 469, a home rule charter, or special law. History: 1997 c 148 s 1 Luckily, Ramsey has no Port Authority in a deep hole, since the Subd. 2 listing prominently omits “Port Authority” from the favored list. Make of that what you will, seeing HRA on the list, etc. What I am curious about, is whether Darren’s Landform contract with the city, should a new council want to void it in January but not pay future commissions or a severance fee, would be a voidable executory contract under the bankruptcy law applicable to municipal bankruptcy. Should a new council wish that result, it would no longer be a moot or hypothetical thing. Also, if the contract still says all intellectual property prepared under the contract is city property, not the contractor’s, then might there be dispute over surrender of the fabled “dashboard” and/or all contact lists and customer info – (how else would delayed commissions be determinable) – would that be a material breach allowing the city to claim any performance duty on its part, such as paying delayed/deferred commissions, would be excused by such a breach? Divorces can be messy. If/when they may happen. Of course a new council in January has all options on the table. That would include embracing Landform with a contract extension even if new people are elected, or letting the contract run its course and expire in March, 2013. I do not believe the present council locked in any longer time frame beyond March 2013, I could be wrong, and there is always a chance that a post-election lame duck effort to give Darren better terms and conditions might be attempted. As to any new council effects; Brünnhilde sings the final aria at midnight on new years eve. And as to what may happen, it is anyone’s guess. Especially before the election. As with the current council, and past councils, the duty is to do what is believed to be in the best long term interest of the city, to maximize the best future likelihoods. Views of what that might be clearly can differ greatly, but the new council will inherit the Flaherty adventure, for better or worse, and will have the benefit of the new Northstar stop; whatever that proves to be. The new council also seems locked into the Armstrong interchange alteration, given how the present council was super-aggressive in changing the Sunwood layout. The new council will have to look at reserves, and whether the spending down has been excessive, or optimal. Reserves were very high when Bob Ramsey started his term as mayor, and given a decision was made to buy the distressed Town Center project, doing it via spending down reserves for the cash amount [apart from compromised tax liens] probably made more sense than bonding. The third water tower was a proper expense from the municipal water and sewer reserve account. Presumably the new council will have to look at the books, report a prognosis, and go on from there. If there is a major change of council personnel it seems citizens would deserve that before the council does much else. Legacy duties and responsibilities will be inherited, much as the Bob Ramsey council inherited debt service duties dating back to James Norman days. To before the real estate crash. Before the Nedegaard bankruptcy/failure. History imposes limits and responsibilities. ___________FURTHER UPDATE_________ The email quoted above about reserve funds, and using highway improvement funds for property purchase aspects instead of contract costs for the actual road building, while not something I can answer, did lead to my discovery of MS 471.572 “INFRASTRUCTURE REPLACEMENT RESERVE FUND” with a Subd. 4 that is intriguing. Not that this city has been responsive to citizen expressions of a wish for more frequent use of referendum, but if there is a referendum about a reserve fund, it is locked into its designated purpose, and playing other gambles out of it would be problematic. I am unaware of Ramsey history, whether things like the Landfill Trust Fund were locked into specific purposes and uses, that way. Readers with knowledge of reserve fund histories are asked to submit helpful comments.
Source: blogspot.com